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Abstract
We develop a model that, at the aggregate level, is similar to the one sector neoclassical growth model,
while, at the disaggregate level, has implications for the path of observable measures of technology
adoption. We estimate our model using data on the di⁄usion of 15 technologies in 166 countries over
the last two centuries. We evaluate the implications of our estimates for aggregate TFP and per capita
income. Our results reveal that, on average, countries have adopted technologies 47 years after their
invention. There is substantial variation across technologies and countries. Over the past two centuries,
newer technologies have been adopted faster than old ones. The cross-country variation in the adoption
of technologies accounts for at least a quarter of per capita income di⁄erences.
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11 Introduction
Most cross-country di⁄erences in per capita output are due to di⁄erences in total factor productivity (TFP),
rather than to di⁄erences in the levels of factor inputs.1 These cross-country TFP disparities can be divided
into two parts: those due to di⁄erences in the range of technologies used and those due to non-technological
factors that a⁄ect the e¢ ciency with which all technologies and production factors are operated. In this
paper, we explore the importance of the range of technologies used to explain cross-country di⁄erences in
TFP.
Existing studies of technology adoption are not well suited to answer this question. On the one hand,
macroeconomic models of technology adoption (e.g. Parente and Prescott, 1994, and Basu and Weil, 1998)
use an abstract concept of technology that is hard to match with data. On the other hand, the applied
microeconomic technology di⁄usion literature (Griliches, 1957, Mans￿eld, 1961, Gort and Klepper, 1982,
among others) involves the estimation of di⁄usion curves for a relatively small number of technologies and
countries. These di⁄usion curves, however, are purely statistical descriptions which are not embedded in an
aggregate model. Hence, it is di¢ cult to use them to explore the aggregate implications of the empirical
￿ndings.2
In this paper we bridge the gap between these two literatures by developing a new model of technology
di⁄usion. Our model has two main properties. First, at the aggregate level it is similar to the one sector
neoclassical growth model. Second, at the disaggregate level it has implications for the path of observable
measures of technology adoption. These properties allow us to estimate our model using data on speci￿c
technologies and then use it to evaluate the implications of our estimates for aggregate TFP and per capita
income.
A technology, in our model, is a group of production methods that is used to produce an intermediate
good or service. Each production method is embodied in a di⁄erentiated capital good. A potential producer
of a capital good decides whether to incur a ￿xed cost of adopting the new production method. If he does,
he will be the monopolist supplying the capital good that embodies the speci￿c production method. This
decision determines whether or not a production method is used, which is the extensive margin of adoption.
The size of the adoption costs a⁄ects the length of time between the invention and the eventual adoption of
a production method, i.e. its adoption lag. Once the production method has been introduced, its productivity
determines how many units of the associated capital good are demanded, which re￿ ects the intensive margin
1Klenow and Rodr￿quez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), and Jerzmanowski (2004).
2Another strand of the literature has also used more aggregate measures of di⁄usion to explore the determinants of adoption
lags (Saxonhouse and Wright, 2000, and Caselli and Coleman, 2001) or the di⁄usion curve (Manuelli and Seshadri, 2003) for
one technology. Our paper di⁄ers from these three studies in that (i) we speci￿cally develop an aggregate model to assess the
implications of technology adoption di⁄erentials for per capita GDP disparities, and (ii) our analysis covers a wide range of
technologies and countries.
2of adoption. Our model is thus very similar in spirit to the barriers to riches model of Parente and Prescott
(1994), which yields endogenous TFP di⁄erentials across countries due to di⁄erent adoption lags.
The endogenous adoption decisions determine the growth rate of productivity embodied in the technology
through two channels. First, because new production methods embody a higher level of productivity their
adoption raises the average productivity level of the production methods in use. This is what we call the
embodiment e⁄ect. Second, an increase in the range of production methods used also results in a gain from
variety that boosts productivity. This is the variety e⁄ect.
When the number of available production methods is very small, an increase in the number of methods
has a relatively large e⁄ect on embodied productivity. As this number increases, the productivity gains from
such an increase decline. Thus, the variety e⁄ect leads to a non-linear trend in the embodied productivity
level. Since adoption lags a⁄ect the range of production methods used and thus the variety e⁄ect, adoption
lags a⁄ect the curvature in the path of embodied productivity.
Our model maps this curvature in embodied productivity into similar non-linearities in the evolution of
observable measures of technology adoption, such as the number of units of capital that embody a given
technology or the output produced with this technology. These measures capture both the extensive as well
as the intensive margin of adoption of these technologies. We use our theory to derive reduced form equations
that describe how these two margins depend on adoption lags as well as on economy-wide conditions that
determine aggregate demand.
Our model is broadly consistent with the empirical di⁄usion literature in that it predicts an S-shape
di⁄usion pattern for conventional adoption measures that only capture the extensive adoption margin. How-
ever, the actual di⁄usion curves implied by the reduced form equations are not S-shaped. This is because
our measures incorporate both the extensive and intensive adoption margins. S-shape curves provide a poor
approximation to the evolution of technology measures that incorporate the latter.3
We use data from Comin, Hobijn, and Rovito (2006) to explore the adoption lags for 15 technologies for
166 countries. Our data cover major technologies related to transportation, telecommunication, IT, health
care, steel production, and electricity. We obtain precise and plausible estimates of the adoption lags for two
thirds of the 1278 technology-country pairs for which we have su¢ cient data. There are three main ￿ndings
that are especially worth taking away from this exploration of technology di⁄usion.
First, adoption lags are large. The average adoption lag is 47 years. There is, however, substantial
variation in these lags, both across countries and across technologies. The standard deviation in adoption
lags is 39 years. An analysis of variance yields that 54% of the variance in adoption lags is explained by
variation across technologies, 18% by cross-country variation, and 11% percent by the covariance between the
two. The remaining 17% is unexplained. We also ￿nd that newer technologies have been adopted faster than
3See Comin et al. (2008) for a detailed explanation of this argument.
3older ones. This acceleration in technology adoption has taken place during the whole two centuries that are
covered by our data. Thus, it started long before the digital revolution or the post-war globalization process
that have often been cited as the driving forces behind rapid di⁄usion of technologies in recent decades.
Second, the remarkable development records of Japan in the second half of the Nineteenth Century
and the ￿rst half of the Twentieth Century and of the, so-called, East Asian Tigers in the second half
of the Twentieth Century all coincided with a catch-up in the range of technologies used with respect to
industrialized countries. All these development ￿ miracles￿involved a substantial reduction of the technology
adoption lags in these countries relative to those in (other) OECD countries.
Third, our model can be used to quantify the aggregate implications of the estimated adoption lags for
cross-country per capita income di⁄erentials. Doing so yields that cross-country di⁄erences in the timing of
adoption of new technologies seems to account for at least a quarter of per capita income disparities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Because the focus of our analysis is on technology, we
devote the second section of our paper on a detailed explanation of the assumptions we make about the
technology structure in our model economy. We then proceed in two directions.
First, in Section 3 we show how our assumptions nest a version of the one-sector neoclassical growth
model with adoption lags, we introduce a set of simplifying assumptions about the technology, as well as
add preferences, endogenize the technology adoption decision, and show how these assumptions yield the
neoclassical growth model.
Second, in Section 4, we discuss how we identify and estimate the adoption lags for the country-technology
pairs in our data. In Section 5, we present our estimates, use them for country case-studies, and quantify
their implications for cross-country TFP di⁄erentials. In Section 6, we conclude by presenting directions for
future research. For the sake of brevity, most of the mathematical derivations are relegated to Appendix B.
2 Technology and adoption lags
2.1 Technology
Final output production:
We present our theoretical analysis in the context of a one sector model. The output of the unique ￿nal








, with ￿ > 1: (1)
Description of technology:
A technology, indexed by ￿, is a group of production methods that are jointly used to produce a particular
intermediate good, Y￿. Each production method associated with a given technology, ￿; corresponds to a
4di⁄erent capital vintage. For example, the technology of sail ships is used to provide the output of sail
merchant shipping services which is used in the production of aggregate output. A new version of a sail ship
constitutes a new capital vintage used for the production of sail merchant shipping services.
Productivity growth is embodied in new capital vintages. The embodied productivity of new vintages
grows at a rate ￿￿ across vintages. This rate is technology-speci￿c, as indicated by the subindex ￿. The
productivity of a given vintage is constant over time.
Some innovations represent a signi￿cant breakthrough with respect to existing technologies. For example,
the ￿rst version of the steam ship. We interpret that these innovations as the beginning of a new technology
used to produce a new intermediate good, in this case steam shipping services.
The classi￿cation of capital vintages into technologies is important for two reasons. First, because
the productivity growth rate, ￿￿, varies across technologies. Second, because the elasticity of substitution
between production methods may be di⁄erent within a technology as opposed to between technologies.
Each instant, a new production method appears exogenously for each of the existing technologies. New
technologies appear at pre-speci￿ed times. This characterizes the evolution of the world technology frontier.
We denote the set of production methods in the world for technology ￿ as V ￿. Let v￿ be the ￿rst capital





world technology frontier. A country does not necessarily use all the capital vintages that are available in the
world for the production of intermediate ￿. We denote the set of vintages actually used by V￿ = [v￿;t ￿ D￿;t].
Here D￿;t ￿ 0 denotes the age of the best technology vintage that is adopted. It re￿ ects the amount of time
between when the best technology in use became available and when it was adopted; the adoption lag of
technology ￿.4
Intermediate goods production:
The amount of intermediate good ￿ produced is a CES aggregate of the output produced with each of the










where ￿ > 1.
Yv￿ is the output produced with vintage v. This output is produced competitively by combining the




where Zv￿ is the productivity level embodied in the capital good of vintage v: We assume that Zv￿ is constant
4In what follows, to simplify notation, we only include the time subscript t when necessary for the exposition.
5for a given production method and varies across vintages in the following way
Zv￿ = Zv￿e￿￿(v￿v￿), (4)
where ￿￿ represents the growth rate of productivity embodied in new vintages used in the production of
intermediate ￿.
Capital goods production and technology adoption:
Capital goods are produced by monopolistic competitors. Each of them holds the patent of the capital good
used for a particular production method. It takes Q￿ units of ￿nal output to produce one unit of capital
of any vintage of technology ￿. This production process is assumed to be fully reversible. Q￿ declines at a
constant rate q￿.
By introducing investment-speci￿c technological progress in this way, we allow for a trend in the relative
price of capital goods when measured in the particular units used in our data set. For example, when we
measure the number of trucks, q￿ re￿ ects the decline in the price per truck relative to the ￿nal good price.
The capital goods suppliers rent out their capital goods at the rental rate Rv￿ and capital goods depreciate
at the technology-speci￿c rate ￿￿.
2.2 Factor demands
Final good demand:















We use the ￿nal good as the numeraire good throughout our analysis and, accordingly, normalize P = 1.
Intermediate goods demand:
















Labor is homogenous, competitively supplied at the real rate W and perfectly mobile across sectors.
Recall that the rental rate of the capital good that embodies vintage v of technology ￿ is Rv￿: Since Yvt is













The supplier of each capital good recognizes that the rental price he charges for the capital good, Rv￿,
a⁄ects the price of the output associated with the capital good and, therefore, its demand, Yv￿. The




















Here, ￿ is the constant price elasticity of demand that the capital goods supplier faces. As a result, the pro￿t
maximizing rental price equals a constant markup times the marginal production cost of a unit of capital.
Because of the durability of capital and the reversibility of its production process, the per-period marginal
production cost of capital is Q￿ times the technology-speci￿c user-cost of capital. Thus, the rental price that
maximizes the pro￿ts accrued by the capital good producer is
Rv￿ = R￿ =
￿
￿ ￿ 1





￿￿1 is the constant gross markup factor.
2.3 Aggregates at the intermediate good level
The lack of data at the capital vintage level makes it impossible to conduct empirical analyses at this level
of aggregation. Therefore, we derive the technology-speci￿c aggregates for which data are available.
Technology level output:
The factor demands for the capital vintage speci￿c output Yv￿ allow us to write intermediate output pro-






















Just like for the underlying capital vintage speci￿c outputs, the total wage bill paid to labor used to produce
intermediate ￿ exhausts a constant fraction (1 ￿ ￿) of the revenue generated by the sale of intermediate
good ￿ and the rental costs of capital exhaust the rest. Moreover, the price of the intermediate equals the












7Technology speci￿c TFP and adoption lags:



















From this equation, it can be seen that our model introduces two mechanisms by which the adoption lags,
D￿;t, a⁄ect the level of TFP in the production of intermediate ￿: (i) the embodiment e⁄ect; and (ii) the
variety e⁄ect.
First, as newer vintages with higher embodied productivity are adopted in the economy, the level of
embodied productivity increases. This mechanism is captured by the ￿ embodiment e⁄ect￿term of (14) which
re￿ ects the productivity embodied in the best vintage adopted in the economy.
The range of vintages available for production also a⁄ects the level of embodied productivity of technology
￿. In particular, an increase in the measure of vintages adopted leads to higher productivity through the
gains from variety. This is captured by the ￿ variety e⁄ect￿term in expression (14).
3 One-sector growth model
In order to develop a one-sector aggregate growth model using the notion of technology introduced above,
we abstract from most of the cross-technology heterogeneity. In particular, we assume that: (i) the growth
rate of embodied technological change is the same across technologies, such that ￿￿ = ￿ for all ￿; (ii) the
rate of investment speci￿c technological change is zero for all technologies, such that q￿ = q = 0 for all ￿
and we normalize Q = 1; (iii) all types of capital goods are subject to the same physical depreciation rate,
i.e. ￿￿ = ￿ for all ￿; and, ￿nally, the within technology elasticity of substitution across vintages is the same
as the between technologies elasticity of substitution, ￿ = ￿.
At each instant a new technology ￿ is introduced, such that ￿ indexes both the technology as well as
its time of introduction. A new vintage of each existing technology is introduced at every instant. New
vintages of a given technologies are more productive than older vintages. Furthermore, for a given date of
introduction, vintages of more modern technologies are more productive than those of older technologies.
The following expression for the productivity embodied in vintage v of technology ￿ captures these
assumptions:
Zv;￿ = Z0e￿￿e￿v, where ￿;￿ > 0. (15)
Note that ￿ can be interpreted as within technology embodied technological change while ￿ can be interpreted
as between technology embodied technological change.
83.1 Preferences, technology adoption decision, and market structure
Preferences:
A measure one of households populate the economy. They inelastically supply one unit of labor every instant,





where Ct denotes per capita consumption and ￿ is the discount rate. The representative household has an
initial wealth level of S0 and cannot run Ponzi schemes.
Capital goods production and technology adoption:
In order to become the sole supplier of a particular capital vintage, the capital good producer must undertake
an investment, in the form of an up-front ￿xed cost. We interpret this investment as the adoption cost of
the production method associated with the capital vintage.
The cost of adopting vintage v for technology ￿ at instant t is assumed to be






Pv;￿Yv;￿, where # > 0, (17)
and V is the steady state stock market capitalization to GDP ratio.5
We include V in the cost function for normalization purposes. The parameter # re￿ ects how much faster
adoption costs are rising for the available vintages than the bene￿ts of adoption and the parameter b re￿ ects
barriers to adoption in the sense of Parente and Prescott (1994).
3.2 Optimality conditions and aggregation
Consumers:
The representative consumer￿ s path of consumption is characterized by the following Euler equation
_ C
C
= r ￿ ￿ (18)






ds = S0. (19)
Aggregate technology:
In a similar way to the intermediate goods production function, we obtain an aggregate production function.
That is, ￿nal output can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form
Y = AK￿L1￿￿, (20)










K￿d￿ and L =
Z t
￿1
L￿d￿ = 1, (21)












Technology adoption and adoption lags:




















































is the stockmarket capitalization to GDP ratio.6
Optimal adoption implies that, every instant, all the vintages for which the value of the ￿rm that produces
the capital good is at least as large as the adoption cost will be adopted. That is, for all vintages, v, that
are adopted at time t
￿v￿ ￿ Mv￿ (26)
This holds with equality for the best vintage adopted if there is a positive adoption lag.7











and is constant across technologies, ￿.
The resulting aggregate TFP level equals
At = A0e(￿+￿)(t￿Dt), (28)
6This can be interpreted as the stockmarket capitalization if all monopolistic competitors are publicly traded companies.
7If the frontier vintage, t, is adopted, and there is no adoption lag, then ￿t￿ ￿ Mt￿. For simplicity, we ignore the possibility
that, for the best vintages, already adopted ￿v￿ > Mv￿. In that case, no new vintages are adopted. This possibility is included
in the mathematical derivations in Appendix B.
10where A0 > 0 is a constant that depends on the model parameters.8 Hence, aggregate TFP in this model is
endogenously determined by the adoption lags induced by the barriers to entry.
Moreover, the total adoption costs across all vintages adopted at instant t equal
















D denotes the time derivative of the adoption lags.
3.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium path of the aggregate resource allocation in this economy can be de￿ned in terms of the
following eight equilibrium variables fC;K;I;￿;Y;A;D;V g. Just like in the standard neoclassical growth
model, the capital stock, K, is the only state variable. The eight equations that determine the equilibrium
dynamics of this economy are given by
(i) The consumption Euler equation, (18).
(ii) The aggregate resource constraint9
Y = C + I + ￿. (30)
(iii) The capital accumulation equation
￿
K = ￿￿K + I. (31)
(iv) The production function, (20), taking into account that in equilibrium L = 1.
(v) The adoption cost function, (29).
(vi) The technology adoption equation, (27), that determines the adoption lag.
(vii) The stockmarket to GDP ratio, (25).10
(viii) The aggregate TFP level, (28).
In addition to these equations that pin down the equilibrium dynamics, the lifetime budget constraint, (19),
pins down the initial level of consumption. We derive the balanced growth path and approximate transitional
dynamics of this economy in Appendix B. The growth rate of this economy on the balanced growth path is
(￿ + ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿).
Below the surface:
Underlying these aggregate dynamics, there is a continuum of di⁄usion curves for the expanding set of














9We assume that adoption costs are measured as part of ￿nal demand, such that Y can be interpret as GDP.
10The dynamics of Vt are what are considered in the system of equilibrium equations. The law of motion of the stockmarket


















11vintages and technologies. Where aggregate TFP grows at the constant rate ￿ + ￿, the technology-speci￿c














Just like (14), (32) has a variety e⁄ect which introduces a non-linearity in Z￿. This non-linearity is critical
for our empirical application.
As we show below, the evolution of technology-speci￿c TFP governs the speed of di⁄usion as well as the
shape of the di⁄usion curve of a technology. The variety e⁄ect thus drives the non-linearity in the di⁄usion
curve. Since the measure of varieties adopted depends on the di⁄usion lag, the curvature of the di⁄usion
curve allows us to identify the adoption lags in the data.
4 Empirical application
The simplifying assumptions that we made for the one-sector growth model are useful because they yield a
tractable aggregate production function representation. They do, however, ignore cross-technology variation
that is likely to be important in the data. For our empirical investigation, we reintroduce the cross-technology
variation by allowing ￿￿, ￿￿, q￿ to be di⁄erent across technologies. Our aim is to estimate the adoption lags
for di⁄erent technology-country pairs. To make this estimation practically feasible, we assume that adoption
lags di⁄er across countries and technologies but are constant over time. In this section, we describe our
measures of technology di⁄usion, derive their reduced form equations and describe the method we use to
estimate these equations. Before doing so, however, we relate our measures of di⁄usion to more traditional
measures introduced by Griliches (1957) and Mans￿eld (1961).
4.1 Measures of di⁄usion
The empirical literature on technology di⁄usion has mainly focused on the analysis of the share of potential
adopters that have adopted a technology. Such shares capture the extensive margin of adoption. Computing
these measures requires micro level data that are not available for many technologies and countries. As a
result, over the last 50 years, the di⁄usion of only relatively few technologies in a very limited number of
countries has been documented.
Depending on the level of aggregation we are interested in, our model delivers two counterparts to this
traditional di⁄usion measure: (i) the share of employees involved in the production of good ￿ that use a
technology vintage v0 or more advanced, and (ii) the share of workers in the economy using (any vintage of)
technology ￿:
12The most remarkable ￿nding of the traditional di⁄usion literature is that, for a majority of the technologies
for which it has been possible to construct the di⁄usion measures, the di⁄usion curves are S-shaped. Our
model is roughly consistent with this ￿nding. In particular, before a given vintage has been adopted in the
country, the di⁄usion measure is zero. At the moment in which the technology is adopted, the di⁄usion
measure starts to increase at a decreasing rate until it reaches a plateau where it has fully di⁄used. As
a result, the evolution of our model counterparts to the traditional di⁄usion measures is approximately
S-shaped.
However, the implications of our model for adoption shares are not our main focus. The richness of our
model allows us to explore its predictions for alternative measures of technology di⁄usion for which data
is more widely available. In particular, we focus on (i) Y￿, the level of output of the intermediate good
produced with technology ￿; (ii) K￿, the capital inputs used in the production of this output.
These variables have two advantages over the traditional measures. First, they are available for a broad
set of technologies and countries. Second, they capture (directly or indirectly) the number of units of the new
technology that each of the adopters has adopted. This intensive margin is important to understand cross-
country di⁄erences in adoption patterns. For spindles, for example, Clark (1987) argues that this margin is
key to explaining the di⁄erence in adoption and labor productivity between India and Massachusetts in the
Nineteenth century.
In order to see how our measures relate to the traditional di⁄usion measures consider the following






















The ￿rst component of these expressions measures the share of the labor inputs devoted to technology ￿.
This captures the extensive margin of adoption, and is similar to the measures most commonly used in
empirical microeconomic studies. The second component measures the intensive margin of adoption of the
technology ￿ relative to the economy. In expression (33) this corresponds to the technology-speci￿c capital-
labor ratio relative to the economy wide ratio. In expression (34) it is measured by the labor productivity
in the production of intermediate ￿ relative to aggregate labor productivity. This term re￿ ects what Clark
(1987) perceived was the di⁄erence between Massachusetts and India. Namely, distortions in the adoption
of new technologies that caused an ine¢ ciently low intensity of adoption.11 The third component of (33) is
the capital output ratio and re￿ ects the fact that more capital intensive economies tend to have more capital
embodying all the technologies, including the new ones. Finally, the last component in both expressions
11Interestingly , it can easily be shown, that including these distortions in our model is isomorphic to increasing the cost of
adopting the new technology. Hence, our estimates of the adoption lags will include the e⁄ects of such distortions.
13re￿ ects the size of the economy.
These di⁄erent components are not separately distinguishable in the data. To make further progress in
our exploration of technology di⁄usion, we use our model to derive estimable reduced form equations for K￿
and Y￿. These reduced form equations relate the paths of the ￿rst two components of (33) and (34) to the
adoption lags, D￿. This allows us to relate the technology adoption measures to observable variables and to
estimate the adoption lags.
4.2 Reduced form equations
Let￿ s denote the technology measures for which we derive reduced form equations by m￿ 2 fy￿;k￿g. Small
letters denote logarithms. By combining the log-linearized versions of the demand equation (5)




and the intermediate goods price (13)
p￿ = ￿￿ln￿ ￿ z￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(y ￿ l) + ￿r￿, (36)
we obtain the reduced form equation (37) for y￿
12
y￿ = y +
￿
￿ ￿ 1
[z￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(y ￿ l) ￿ ￿r￿ + ￿ln￿] (37)
Similarly, we obtain the reduced form equation for k￿ by combining the log-linear capital demand equation
k￿ = ln￿ + p￿ + y￿ ￿ r￿. (38)
with (35) and (36).
These expressions depend on the adoption lag D￿; through the e⁄ect the lag has on z￿:
They also contain the technology-speci￿c capital rental rate, r￿, for which we do not have data. However
we can use the model to relate r￿ to observable variables. In particular, equation (9) implies that the
technology-speci￿c capital rental rate is the product of the markup factor, the relative investment price, and
the user cost. The user cost depends on the real interest rate, r. Unfortunately, we do not have historical
cross-country data on real interest rates. However, log-linearization of the neoclassical growth model as well
as of our aggregate model yields that the real interest rate is an approximate linear function of the growth
12Using the fact that the ￿nal output is the numeraire, we can rewrite (37) as
y￿ = y +
￿
￿ ￿ 1
((z￿ ￿ z) + ￿(r ￿ r￿))
Intuitively, y￿ depends on aggregate demand and on the technology-speci￿c level of TFP relative to the overall level of TFP
and on the relative rental for technology ￿ capital relative to the aggregate rental rate.
14rate of real GDP per capita. In the neoclassical growth model, this re￿ ects that, along the transitional path,
economies with a below steady state level of capital have a higher marginal product of capital. In our model,
there is the additional e⁄ect of the adoption lags on the transitional path. We use this result to approximate
r￿ ￿ c1 ￿ q￿t + c2￿(y ￿ l). (39)
Here, ￿ denotes the ￿rst-di⁄erence operator in time, such that ￿(y ￿ l) is the growth rate of real GDP
per capita. The trend part re￿ ects investment speci￿c technological change and c1 is a constant. Since the
approximate log-linear relationship between the real interest rate and the growth rate of output depends
both on technology and preference parameters, like the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, both c1 and
c2 depend on preference parameters.
At this point we could estimate the reduced form equations. However, after careful investigation of the
e⁄ect of the rate of embodied productivity, ￿￿, on the dependent variables, we observe that to a ￿rst order
approximation ￿￿ only a⁄ects y￿ and k￿ through the linear trend. More speci￿cally, in Appendix B, we
log-linearize (14) around ￿￿ = 0 to obtain the approximation
z￿ ￿ zv￿ + (￿ ￿ 1)ln(t ￿ T￿) ￿
￿￿
2
(t ￿ T￿), (40)
where T￿ = v￿ + D￿ is the time that the technology is adopted.
In this approximation, the growth rate of embodied technological change, ￿￿, only a⁄ects the linear trend
in z￿. Intuitively, when there are very few vintages in V￿ the growth rate of the number of vintages, i.e. the
growth rate of t ￿ T￿, is very large and it is this growth rate that drives growth in z￿ through the variety
e⁄ect. Only in the long-run, when the growth rate of the number of varieties tapers o⁄, the growth rate of
embodied productivity, ￿￿, becomes the predominant driving force of the variety e⁄ect.
This result implies that, in ￿rst-order, both ￿￿ and q￿ cause a linear trend in our technology measures.
Thus, ￿￿, is only separately identi￿ed from q￿ through second-order e⁄ects, which are small for ￿￿ close to
zero. Therefore, we present the estimates obtained using the log-linear approximation of z￿ in the estimation,
(40), and do not provide estimates of ￿￿.13
Then, as we derive in Appendix B, the reduced form equation that we estimate is the same for both
capital and output measures and is of the form
m￿ = ￿1 + y + ￿2t + ￿3 ((￿ ￿ 1)ln(t ￿ T￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(y ￿ l)) + ￿4￿(y ￿ l) + "￿, (41)
where "￿ is the error term. The reduced form parameters are given by the ￿￿ s. We do not estimate ￿ and
￿. Instead, we calibrate ￿ = 1:3, based on the estimates of the markup in manufacturing from Basu and
13We have also estimated the reduced form equations using the actual expression for z￿, (14). Because ￿￿ is locally non-
identi￿ed at zero, this yields imprecise estimates of ￿￿. However, it results in virtually identical estimates of the adoption
lags.
15Fernald (1997), and ￿ = 0:3 consistent with the post-war U.S. labor share.14
4.3 Identi￿cation of adoption lags and estimation procedure
We use the reduced form equations to estimate country-technology-speci￿c adoption lags. For this purpose,
we make the following three assumptions: (i) Levels of aggregate TFP, relative investment prices, and
units of measurement of the technology measures potentially di⁄er across countries; (ii) technology-speci￿c
growth rates of investment speci￿c technological change, q￿, embodied technological change, ￿￿, as well as
the growth rate of aggregate TFP, are the same across countries; (iii) preferences are potentially di⁄erent
across countries while technology parameters are the same except for the adoption lags.
In order to see how these assumptions translate into cross-country parameter restrictions, we consider
which structural parameters a⁄ect each of the reduced form parameters. The ￿xed e⁄ect, ￿1, captures four
things (i) the units of the technology measure; (ii) the level of the relative price of investment goods, Q￿;
(iii) di⁄erent TFP levels across countries, and (iv) di⁄erences in adoption lags. Because we assume that
these things can vary across countries, we let ￿1 vary across countries as well. The trend-parameter, ￿2,
is assumed to be constant across countries because it only depends on the output elasticity of capital, ￿,15
and on the trends in embodied and investment speci￿c technological change, q￿ and ￿￿. ￿3 only depends
on the technology parameter, ￿, and is therefore also assumed to be constant across countries. The growth
rate of output per capita coe¢ cient, ￿4, is related to the relationship between the interest rate, user cost of
capital, and output growth. Since this relationship depends on preference parameters, like the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, we let ￿4 vary across countries.
Given these cross-country parameter restrictions, the adoption lags are identi￿ed in the data through the
non-linear trend component in equation (41), which is due to the variety e⁄ect. This is the only term a⁄ected
by the adoption lag, D￿. It is also the only term which a⁄ects the curvature of m￿ after controlling for the
e⁄ect of observables such as income, per capita income and the growth in per capita income. Speci￿cally,
it causes the trend in m￿ to monotonically decline with the time since adoption. This is the basis of our
empirical identi￿cation strategy of D￿. Intuitively, our model predicts that, everything else equal, if at a
given moment in time we observe that the trend in m￿ is diminishing faster in one country than another, it
must be because the former country has started adopting the technology more recently.
Because the adoption lag is a parameter that enters non-linearly in (41) for each country, estimating
the system of equations for all countries together is practically not feasible. Instead, we take a two-step
approach. We ￿rst estimate equation (41) using only data for the U.S. This provides us with estimates of
14Our estimates of the adoption lags are robust to alternative calibration of ￿ to a wide range of values both higher and lower
than 1:3.
15The output elasticity of capital is one minus the labor share in our model. Gollin (2002) provides evidence that the labor
share is approximately constant across countries.
16the values of ￿1, ￿4, and D￿ for the U.S. as well as estimates of ￿2 and ￿3 that should hold for all countries.
In the second step we separately estimate (41), and thus ￿1, ￿4, and D￿, for all the countries in the sample
besides the U.S. conditional on the estimates of ￿2 and ￿3 based on the U.S. data.
Besides practicalities, this two-step estimation method is preferable to a system estimation method for
two other reasons. First, if we would apply a system estimation method, data problems for one country
would a⁄ect the estimates for all countries. Since we judge the U.S. data to be most reliable, we use them for
the inference on the parameters that are constant across countries. Second, our model is based on a set of
stark neoclassical assumptions. These assumptions are more applicable to the low frictional U.S. economic
environment than to that of countries in which capital and product markets are substantially distorted.
Thus, we think that our reduced form equation is likely to be misspeci￿ed for some countries other than the
U.S. Including them in the estimation of the joint parameters would a⁄ect the results for all countries.
We estimate all the equations using non-linear least squares. This means that the identifying assumption
that we make is that the logarithm of GDP, of per capita GDP and the growth rate of per capita GDP are
uncorrelated with the technology-speci￿c error, "￿. This identifying assumption essentially means that the
causation goes from aggregate economic activity to the adoption of a particular technology and not the other
way around. This is probably not an unreasonable assumption, since we focus on data for 15 out of many
technologies that drive aggregate economic ￿ uctuations. A piece of evidence that supports this assumption
is that, while our individual measures of technology are highly non-linear, aggregate measures such as log
TFP or log per capita GDP are almost linear.
Because we derive the reduced form equations from a structural model, the theory pins down the set of
explanatory variables. However, even if one takes the theory as given, there are, of course, several potential
sources of bias in our estimates. The most important is our assumption that D￿ is constant over time.
Because D￿ is identi￿ed through the curvature in the data variations in D￿ over time would be identi￿ed
by changes in this curvature. There is simply too little variation in the data for this identi￿cation scheme.
If there is time variation in D￿ then our estimates would be skewed towards the adoption lag at the time
of adoption. This is because the variation in the curvature of the non-linear trend being larger right after
adoption than later on.
5 Results
We consider data for 166 countries and 15 technologies, that span the period from 1820 through 2003. The
technologies can be classi￿ed into 6 categories; (i) transportation technologies, consisting of steam- and
motorships, passenger and freight railways, cars, trucks, and passenger and freight aviation; (ii) telecommu-
nication, consisting of telegraphs, telephones, and cellphones; (iii) IT, consisting of PCs and internet users;
17(iv) medical, being MRI scanners; (v) steel, namely tonnage produced using blast oxygen furnaces; (vi)
electricity.
The technology measures are taken from the CHAT dataset, introduced by Comin and Hobijn (2004)
and expanded by Comin, Hobijn, and Rovito (2006). Real GDP and population data are from Maddison
(2007). Appendix A contains a brief description of each of the 15 technology variables used.
Unfortunately, we do not have data for all 2490 country-technology combinations. For our estimation,
we only consider country-technology combinations for which we have more than 10 annual observations.
There are 1278 such pairs in our data. The third column of Table 1 lists, for each technology, the number of
countries for which we have enough data.
For each of the 15 technologies, we perform the two-step estimation procedure outlined above. We divide
the resulting estimates up into three main groups: (i) plausible and precise, (ii) plausible but imprecise, and
(iii) implausible.
We consider an estimate implausible if our point estimate implies that the technology was adopted more
than 10 years before it was invented. The 10 year cut o⁄ point is to allow for inference error. The sixth
column of Table 1 lists the number of implausible estimates for each of the technologies. In total, we ￿nd
implausible estimates in a bit less than one-third, i.e. 394 out of 1278, of our cases.
We have identi￿ed three main reasons why we obtain implausible estimates. First, as mentioned above,
the adoption year T￿ is identi￿ed by the curvature in the time-pro￿le of the adoption measure. However, for
some countries the data is too noisy to capture this curvature. In that case, the estimation procedure tends
to ￿t the ￿ atter part of the curve through the sample and infers that the adoption date is far in the past.
Second, for some countries the data exhibit a convex technology adoption path rather than the concave one
implied by our structural model. This happens in some African countries that have undergone dramatic
events such as decolonization or civil wars. Third, for some countries we only have data long after the
technology is adopted. In that case ln(t ￿ T￿) exhibits little variation and T￿ is not very well-identi￿ed in
the data. This can either lead to an implausible estimate of T￿ or a plausible estimate with a high standard
error.
Plausible estimates with high standard errors are considered plausible but imprecise. In particular, the
cut o⁄ that we use is that the standard error16 of the estimate of T￿ is bigger than
p
2003 ￿ v￿.17 The
number of plausible but imprecise estimates can be found in the ￿fth column of Table 1. These are 51 out
of the 1278 cases that we consider.
The cases that are neither deemed implausible nor imprecise are considered plausible and precise. The
fourth column of Table 1 reports the number of such cases for each technology. These represent 65 percent
16This standard error is conditional on the estimates of ￿2 and ￿3 that are based on U.S. data and, thus, do not take into
account the inference error in these point estimates.
17This allows for longer con￿dence intervals for older technologies with potentially more imprecise data.
18of all the technology-country pairs. Hence, our model, with the imposed U.S. parameters, yields plausible
and precise estimates for the adoption lags for, a suprising, two-thirds of the technology-country pairs. In
what follows, all our results are based on the sample of 833 plausible and precise estimates.18
Before we summarize the results for these 833 estimates, it is useful to start with an example. Figure
1 shows the actual and ￿tted paths of m￿ for tonnage of steam and motor merchant ships for Argentina,
Japan, Nigeria, and the U.S. The estimated adoption years, T￿, of electricity for these countries are 1870,
1959, 1901, and 1814, respectively. This means that, on average over the sample period, the pattern of U.S.
steam and motor merchant ship adoption is consistent with a 1814 adoption date, according to our model.
Given that the ￿rst steam boat patent in the U.S. was issued in 1788, we thus estimate that the U.S. adopted
the innovations that enabled more e¢ cient motorized merchant shipping services with an average lag of 26
years.
Given the estimates of ￿2 and ￿3 based on the U.S. data, the adoption years are identi￿ed through the
curvature of the path of m￿. The U.S. path is already quite ￿ at in the early part of the sample. This indicates
an early adoption, i.e. a low T￿, and a short adoption lag. When we compare the U.S. and Argentina, we
see that, in most years the path is more steep for Argentina than for the U.S. This is why we ￿nd a later
adoption date and bigger adoption lag for Argentina than for the U.S. Since Japan￿ s path is even steeper
than that of Argentina, the lag for Japan is even larger. A similar analysis reveals why we ￿nd the 1959
adoption date for Nigeria.
The R2￿ s associated with the estimated equations for electricity for Argentina, Japan, Nigeria, and the
U.S. are 0.96, 0.20, 0.86, and 0.95, respectively. The R2 for Japan is very low because our model does not ￿t
the, almost complete, destruction of the Japanese merchant ￿ eet during WWII. The other R2s are not only
high because the model captures the trend in the adoption patters but also because the model captures the
curvature.
The last three columns of Table 1 summarize the properties of the R2￿ s for the 833 plausible and precise
estimates. Since we are imposing the US estimates for ￿2 and ￿3, the R2 can be negative. The second to
last column of Table 1 lists the number of cases for which we ￿nd a positive R2 for each technology.
In total, we ￿nd negative R2￿ s for only 6.8 percent of the cases. Passenger railways and telegraphs are
the two where negative R2 are more prevalent. This means that for those technologies the assumption that
the U.S. estimates for ￿2 and ￿3 apply for all countries seems invalid. These are both technologies that
have seen a decline in the latter part of the sample for the U.S. Such declines lead to estimates of the trend
parameter, ￿2, for the U.S. that do not ￿t the data for countries where these technologies have not seen such
a decline (yet). Though present, such issues do not seem to be predominant in our results.
18Results that also include the imprecise estimates are both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to the ones presented
here.
19The next to last and last columns of Table 1 list the sample mean and standard deviations of the
distributions of positive R2￿ s for each technology. Overall, the average R2, conditional on being positive, is
0.82 and the standard deviation of these R2￿ s is 0.10. Hence, even though we impose U.S. estimates for ￿2
and ￿3 across all countries, the simple reduced form equation, (41), derived from our model captures the
majority of the variation in m￿ over time for the bulk of the country-technology combinations in our sample.
We turn next to the estimates of the di⁄usion lags. The main summary statistics regarding these estimates
are reported in Table 2. The average di⁄usion lag in our sample is 45 years with a median lag of 35. This
means that the average adoption path of countries in our sample over all technologies is similar to that of a
country that adopts the technology 45 years after its invention.
However, there is considerable variation both across technologies and countries. For steam- and mo-
torships as well as railroads we ￿nd that it took about a century before they were adopted in half of the
countries in our sample. This is in stark contrast with PCs and the internet, for which it took less than 15
years for half of the countries in our sample to adopt them.
Though we do not impose it, we ￿nd that the percentiles of the estimated adoption lags are similar for
closely related technologies; passenger and freight rail transportation, cars and trucks, passenger and cargo
aviation, and even for the upper percentiles of telegraphs and telephones.
Table 3 decomposes the variations in adoption lags into parts attributable to country e⁄ects and parts
due to technology e⁄ects. Let i be the country index and let Di￿ be the adoption lag estimated for country




￿ + ui￿ (42)
where D￿
i is a country ￿xed e⁄ect, D￿
￿ is a technology ￿xed e⁄ect, and ui￿ is the residual. The ￿rst line of
the table pertains to (42) with only country ￿xed e⁄ects. Country-speci￿c e⁄ects explain about 30% of the
variation in the estimated adoption lags. Technology-speci￿c e⁄ects explain about twice as much, namely
66% of the variation. This can be seen from the second row of Table 3, which is computed from a version of
regression (42) with only technology ￿xed e⁄ects. The last row of Table 3 shows that country and technology
￿xed e⁄ects jointly explain about 83% of the variation in the estimated adoption lags. Of this, 18% can be
directly attributed to country e⁄ects, 54% can be directly attributed to technology e⁄ects, and the remaining
11% is due to the covariance between these e⁄ects that is the result of the unbalanced nature of the panel
structure of our data.
Understanding the determinants of the cross-country or cross-technology adoption lags is beyond the
goals of this paper. However, we do consider whether adoption lags tend to have gotten smaller over time.
To this end, Figure 2 plots the invention date of each technology, v￿, against the average adoption lag by
technology as well as against the technology ￿xed e⁄ects, D￿
￿, obtained from (42). The message from both
20variables is the same. Newer technologies have di⁄used much faster than older technologies. In particular,
technologies invented ten years later are on average adopted 4.3 years faster.
This ￿nding is remarkably robust. As is clear from Figure 2, the average adoption lags of all 15 tech-
nologies covered in our dataset seem to adhere to this pattern. Moreover, the slope before and after 1950 is
almost the same. Hence, the acceleration of the adoption of technologies seems to have started long before
the digital revolution or the post-war globalization process.
Of course, this trend cannot go on forever. However, it has gone on at this pace for 200 years. If it persists,
it will have major consequences for the cross-country di⁄erences in TFP due to the lag in technology adoption.
In particular, the TFP gap between rich and poor countries due to the lag in technology adoption should be
signi￿cantly reduced.
5.1 Case studies
Thus far, we have focused on computing a set of broad summary statistics that describe the properties of
the estimated adoption lags. In addition to these broad patterns, these estimates also shed some light on a
number of debates that focus on particular (groups of) countries and episodes. To see how, consider Table
4. For each technology, it contains the average adoption lag for di⁄erent (groups of) countries relative to the
average adoption lag for the technology.
5.1.1 U.S. and the U.K.
The U.S. and the U.K. have been the technological leaders over the last two centuries. Most of the major
technologies invented over the last two centuries have been invented either in the U.S. or in the U.K. Table
4 shows that they also have adopted new technologies much faster than the rest of the world. The shorter
adoption lags have surely contributed to their high levels of productivity and per capita income.
5.1.2 Japan
Until the Meiji restoration in 1867, Japan had an important technological gap with the western world. This
is re￿ ected in the Japanese adoption lag in steam and motor ships which is much longer than that in other
OECD countries and is comparable to the lags in Latin America. Technological backwardness, surely, was a
signi￿cant determinant of the development gap between Japan and other (now) industrialized countries; in
1870, Japan￿ s real GDP per capita was 42 percent of the OECD average.
The industrialization process that was catalyzed by the Meiji restoration closed Japan￿ s technological
gap with the western world. This is re￿ ected by Japan￿ s adoption lags for the technologies invented in the
19th century, which are comparable to the lags in other OECD countries. The closing of the technology
gap also diminished the development gap. By 1920, per capita GDP in Japan was 56 percent of the OECD
21average. For those technologies invented in the Twentieth Century, Japan￿ s adoption lag was signi￿cantly
shorter than for the OECD average and it was comparable to the U.S. and also comparable to, if not shorter
than, the U.K.￿ s. For blast oxygen steel, for example, the adoption lag that we estimate for Japan is 5 years
shorter than for the U.S. and almost 6 years shorter than for the U.K. By 1980 Japan￿ s per capita income
was about the same as the U.K., 26 percent higher than the OECD average, and 33 percent lower than the
U.S.
The estimated adoption lags for Japan thus seem to suggest that a large part of Japan￿ s phenomenal rise
in living standards between 1870 and 1980 involved closing the gap between the range technologies Japan
used and those used by the world￿ s industrialized leaders.
5.1.3 East Asian Tigers
Japan￿ s phenomenal rise was outdone in the second half of the 20th century by the East Asian Tigers
(EATs); Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. These four countries experienced ￿ miraculous￿growth
in per capita GDP between 1960 and 1995 of around 6 percent per year.
There is disagreement about the sources of this growth. Young (1995) claims that factor accumulation
is the main source of growth in the EATs, while Hsieh (2002) challenges this view and argues that the TFP
growth experienced by the EATs is underestimated by Young (1995).19
Whether or not adoption lags show up as TFP or factor accumulation di⁄erentials depends on the extent
to which capital stock data are quality adjusted. However, what we can say, based on our estimates, is that,
just like for Japan, the growth spurt of the EATs has been associated with a substantial reduction in their
technology adoption lags.
From Table 4, it is clear that the EATs had long adoption lags for early technologies. In particular, for
technologies invented before 1950, the EATs￿adoption lags were often longer than in Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA), and almost always longer than in Latin America. For newer technologies, however, the EAT￿ s adoption
lags are shorter than in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, EATs adopted technologies invented
since 1950 about as fast as OECD countries.
Young (1992) focuses on the sources of growth in Singapore and Hong Kong and argues that the lower TFP
growth rate observed in Singapore re￿ ects its faster rate of structural transformation towards the production
of electronics and services, which did not allow agents to learn how to e¢ ciently use older technologies.
Some of the post-1950 technologies in our data set such as computers, cellphones, and the internet are surely
signi￿cant for the production of both electronics and services. Hence, an implication of the Young hypothesis
would be that the Singaporean adoption lags in these technologies are shorter than in Hong Kong. As can
19More speci￿cally, According to Hsieh, TFP growth was 2.2% in Singapore (vs. -0.7 for Young), 3.7% in Taiwan (vs. 2.1%
for Young), 1.5% in Korea (vs. 1.7% for Young) and 2.3% in Hong Kong (vs. 2.7% for Young).
22be seen from Table 5, this is not what we ￿nd. Singapore and Hong Kong are estimated to have the same
adoption lags in PCs and the internet, 14 and 7 years respectively. Hong Kong is estimated to have adopted
cellphones three years earlier than Singapore.
5.1.4 Latin America
Where the EATs are considered growth ￿ miracles￿ , Latin American countries are often labeled as growth
￿ failures￿ . Some of them, such as Chile and Argentina, were among the richest countries in the world during
the late 1800s and the ￿rst half of the Twentieth Century (De Long, 1988). This designation is re￿ ected
in the fact that for the pre-1950 technologies Latin American countries adopted new technologies faster
than the average country. Since World War II, however, they have failed to maintain their position in the
development rankings and have been leapfrogged by numerous emerging economies, mostly in Asia. As can
be seen from Table 4, this disappointing growth performance since 1950 coincides with longer lags in the
adoption of new technologies in Latin American countries than in the average country.
5.1.5 Sub-Saharan Africa
Most Sub-Saharan countries have failed to grow at above average rates despite their low initial per capita
income. This performance is consistent with the long lags in technology adoption reported in Table 4. For
example, the adoption lags for passenger and freight aviation were, respectively, 22 and 33 years longer than
for the average country. The extra lag was 24 years for steam and motor ships, 30 years for the telegraph, and
10 years for the telephone. The most recent technologies have also been adopted more slowly in Sub-Saharan
countries than in the rest of the world. However, due to the overall decline in adoption lags, the di⁄erence
between the lags of Sub-Saharan African countries and the average adoption lags for these technologies are
much shorter, i.e. between 1 and 2 years.
5.2 Development accounting
The brief case studies presented above suggest that variation in adoption lags may be associated with both
cross-country and time series variation in per capita income. Next, we explore whether the annecdotes
described above can be generalized. Speci￿cally, we ask the following question: Are the adoption lags that
we estimated a signi￿cant potential source of cross-country per capita income di⁄erences?
To answer this question, we have to approximate the aggregate e⁄ect of the estimated adoption lags for
the 15 technologies on per capita GDP levels. We do so by using the equilibrium results of our one-sector
growth model. If the only source of cross-country di⁄erentials in per capita GDP is adoption lags, then, in
23steady state, the log di⁄erence of country i￿ s level of real GDP per capita with that of the U.S. is given by
(yi ￿ l) ￿ (yUSA ￿ l) =
￿ + ￿
1 ￿ ￿
(DUS ￿ Di), (43)
where (￿ + ￿) is the growth rate of aggregate TFP, which is 1.4% for the U.S. private business sector during
the postwar period. We observe the left hand side of (43) in our data and approximate the right hand side
in the following way. We use ￿ + ￿ = 0:014 and ￿ = 0:3, consistent with postwar U.S. data. Moreover, we
use the country ￿xed e⁄ects from (42) to approximate Di ￿ D￿
i . Hence, we assume that the country-speci￿c
adoption lags we have estimated for each country using our sample of technologies is representative of the
average adoption lags across all the technologies used in production.
Figure 3 plots the data for both sides of (43) for 123 countries in our dataset. The correlation between
both sides is 0.51. The solid line is the regression line while the dashed line is the 45￿-line. The slope of the
regression line is about 0.25, which can be interpreted as that our model and estimates explain about one
fourth of the log per capita GDP di⁄erentials observed in the data.
The model seems to explain a much larger part of per-capita income di⁄erentials for high-income indus-
trialized countries that make up the set of observations in the upper-right corner of the ￿gure.20 This may
result from a downward bias in our estimates of D￿
i for the poor countries in our sample. Speci￿cally, due
to lack of data and/or plausible estimates for older technologies in poor countries, these technologies, which
tend to be adopted more slowly, do not a⁄ect the estimate of D￿
i for poor countries. This may result in
a downward bias of the average adoption lag for poor countries and in a lower cross-country dispersion in
adoption lags and in TFP di⁄erentials due to di⁄erences in adoption.
In conclusion, our empirical exploration shows that adoption lags account for a substantial share of
cross-country per capita income di⁄erences. The share they account for seems to be at least 25%, if not
more.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have built and estimated a model of technology di⁄usion and growth that has two main
characteristics. First, at the aggregate level, it is similar to the one sector neoclassical growth model. Second,
at the disaggregate level, it has implications for the path of observable measures of technology adoption,
such as the number of units of capital that embody a given technology or the output produced with this
technology.
The main focus of our analysis is on adoption lags. These lags are de￿ned as the length of time between the
invention and adoption of a technology. Our model provides a theoretical framework that links the adoption
20The slope for these countries is approximately 1.
24lag of a technology to the level of productivity embodied in the capital associated with the technology.
It also relates the path of the observable technology adoption measures over time to the path of embodied
productivity and to economy-wide factors driving aggregate demand. The adoption lag determines the shape
of a non-linear trend in embodied productivity as well as in the path of the technology measures. It is this
non-linear trend term that allows us to identify adoption lags in the data.
We estimate adoption lags for 15 technologies and 166 countries over the period 1820-2003, using data
from Comin, Rovito, and Hobijn (2006). Our model does a good job in ￿tting the di⁄usion curves. For two
thirds of the technology-country pairs we obtain precise and plausible estimates of the adoption lags. In light
of this result, we conclude that our model of di⁄usion provides an empirically relevant micro-foundation for
a new set of measures of technology di⁄usion that are more comprehensive and easier to obtain than the
measures used in the traditional empirical di⁄usion literature.
We obtain three key ￿ndings. The ￿rst is that adoption lags are large, 47 years on average, and vary a
lot. The standard deviation is 39 years. Most of this variation is due to technology-speci￿c variation, which
contributes more than half of the variance of adoption lags in our sample. Over the two centuries for which
we have data the average adoption lag across countries for new technologies has steadily declined.
The second ￿nding is that the growth ￿ miracles￿of Japan and the East Asian Tigers, though more than
half a century apart, both coincided with a reduction of the technology adoption lags in these countries
relative to those in their OECD counterparts.
Third, when we use our model to quantify the implications of the country-speci￿c variation in adoption
lags for cross-country per capita income di⁄erentials, we ￿nd that di⁄erences in technology adoption account
for at least a quarter of per capita income disparities in our sample of countries.
Our exploration yields a set of precise estimates of the size of adoption lags across a broad range of
technologies and countries. We plan on using these in subsequent work to investigate what are the key
cross-country di⁄erences in endowments, institutions, and policies that impinge on technology di⁄usion.
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27A Data
The data that we use are taken from two sources. Real GDP and population data are taken from Maddison
(2007). The data on the technology measure are from the Cross-Country Historical Adoption of Technology
(CHAT) data set, ￿rst described in Comin, Hobijn, and Rovito (2006). The ￿fteen particular technology
measures that we consider are:
1. Steam and motor ships:
De￿nition: Gross tonnage (above a minimum weight) of steam and motor ships in use at midyear.
Invention year: 1788; the year the ￿rst (U.S.) patent was issued for a steam boat design.
2. Railways - Passengers:
De￿nition: Passenger journeys by railway in passenger-KM.
Invention year: 1825; the year of the ￿rst regularly schedule railroad service to carry both goods and
passengers.
3. Railways - Freight:
De￿nition: Metric tons of freight carried on railways (excluding livestock and passenger baggage).
Invention year: 1825; same as passenger railways.
4. Cars:
De￿nition: Number of passenger cars (excluding tractors and similar vehicles) in use.
Invention year: 1885; the year Gottlieb Daimler built the ￿rst vehicle powered by an internal combus-
tion engine.
5. Trucks:
De￿nition: Number of commercial vehicles, typically including buses and taxis (excluding tractors and
similar vehicles), in use.
Invention year: 1885; same as cars.
6. Aviation - Passengers:
De￿nition: Civil aviation passenger-KM traveled on scheduled services by companies registered in the
country concerned.
Invention year: 1903; The year the Wright brothers managed the ￿rst succesful ￿ ight.
7. Aviation - Freight:
De￿nition: Civil aviation ton-KM of cargo carried on scheduled services by companies registered in
the country concerned.
Invention year: 1903; same as aviation - passengers.
288. Telegraph:
De￿nition: Number of telegrams sent.
Invention year: 1835; year of invention of telegraph by Samuel Morse at New York University.
9. Telephone:
De￿nition: Number of telegrams sent.
Invention year: 1876; year of invention of telephone by Alexander Graham Bell.
10. Cellphone:
De￿nition: Number of users of portable cell phones.
Invention year: 1973; ￿rst call from a portable cellphone.
11. Personal computers:
De￿nition: Number of self-contained computers designed for use by one person.
Invention year: 1973; ￿rst computer based on a microprocessor.
12. Internet users:
De￿nition: Number of people with access to the worldwide network.
Invention year: 1983; introduction of TCP/IP protocol.
13. MRIs:
De￿nition: Number of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) units in place.
Invention year: 1977; ￿rst MRI-scanner built.
14. Blast Oxygen Steel:
De￿nition: Crude steel production (in metric tons) in blast oxygen furnances (a process that replaced
bessemer and OHF processes).
Invention year: 1950; invention of Blast Oxygen Furnace.
15. Electricity:
De￿nition: Gross output of electric energy (inclusive of electricity consumed in power stations) in
KwHr.
Invention year: 1882; ￿rst commercial powerstation on Pearl Street in New York City.
29B Mathematical details
Derivation of equation (8):
The demand for capital of a particular vintage is given by the factor demand equation
Rv￿Kv￿ = ￿Pv￿Yv￿ (44)























































which is equation (8).
Derivation of equation (9):
The Lagrangian associated with the dynamic pro￿t maximization problem of the supplier of capital good v for intermediate ￿








where Hv￿s is the current value Hamiltonian. We will drop the time subscript s in what follows. Here



















￿v￿ (Iv￿ ￿ ￿￿Kv￿)
Here ￿v￿ is the co-state variable associated with the demand function that the capital goods supplier faces and ￿v￿ is the
co-state variable associated with the capital accumulation equation.
The resulting optimality conditions read
w.r.t. Rv￿: (1 + ￿v￿)Kv￿ + (￿ ￿ 1)￿v￿Kv￿ = 0
w.r.t. Iv￿: ￿v￿ = Q

















Q(r + ￿￿ + q￿)








Derivation of intermediate technology aggregation results:




Lv￿dv = (1 ￿ ￿)
Z
v2V￿








Pv￿Yv￿dv = ￿P￿Y￿ (56)


















































































The value of the unit production cost follows from the unit production cost of a Cobb-Douglas production function. The
aggregation results at the highest level of aggregation can be derived in a similar way.

















































Derivation of equation (24):

























































31This means that the market value of each of the capital goods suppliers of vintage v, for each of the technologies, at time t




































































Derivation of equilibrium adoption lag, (27):
The optimal adoption of technology vintages implies that the best vintage adopted at each instant satis￿es
￿v￿ = Mv￿ (69)
The adoption costs satisfy

























































and constant across technologies, ￿.
Best vintage adopted:
In the main text, we present the equilibrium dynamics of the model for the particular case in which, at every instant, there are
some vintages adopted. This does not have to be the case along all equilibrium paths of this economy. Here, in the appendix,
we derive the general equilibrium dynamics of the model and subsequently explain how the one main text is a special case.
For these general dynamics, we de￿ne vt as the best vintage adopted until time t. This means that if vt > t ￿ Dt, then,
at instant t, there will be no additional vintages adopted. In the main text, we limited ourselves to the case in which, at any
point in time, vt = t ￿ Dt.
Derivation of aggregate TFP, (28):
















































































which, under the assumption that vt = t ￿ Dt, equals
At = A0e(￿+￿)(t￿Dt) (75)
Derivation of aggregate adoption costs, (29):
We derive the aggregate adoption costs at each instant of time by taking the limit of the adoption cost at a period of time of















































































































































































































































































































which allows us to write































































































































































































































34Hence, the second part of the integral is zero and the aggregate adoption cost at each instant in time are given by










































￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
(89)








Yt = Ct + It + ￿t (91)
The capital accumulation equation




The aggregate TFP equation
At = A0e(￿+￿)vt (94)
The adoption cost equation

















































































if vt = t ￿ Dt
0 if vt > t ￿ Dt
(99)
Because, in the main text we assumed that vt = t ￿ Dt for all t, the dynamic equilibrium equations in the main text are based
on the assumption that along the equilibrium paths considered
￿
vt = 1 ￿
￿




We will consider the balanced growth path in this economy in deviation from the trend
At = A0e(￿+￿)t (100)










































Dt, Vt, and v￿
t = vt ￿ t (102)
Derivation of transformed dynamic system:
The resulting dynamic equations that de￿ne the transitional dynamics of the economy around the balanced growth path are






















































The aggregate adoption cost
￿￿




























































































￿1 if vt > ￿Dt
(111)
Steady state equations:









































36The trend adjusted productivity level
A
￿ = e￿(￿+￿)D (116)
The aggregate adoption cost
￿






















ln(1 + b) (118)



















































￿￿1 (￿ + ￿)
o (121)
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37while the aggregate adoption cost is
￿
























Note that, for steady state consumption to be positive, we need a restriction on the parameters, such that the total adoption
costs do not fully exhaust productive capacity.
Transitional dynamics:
The next thing is to linearize the transitional dynamics around the steady state. Note that this model has only one state
variable, namely the capital stock Kt. The stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, Vt, is a jump variable and so are the
adoption lag, Dt, the best vintage adopted, vt, and the trend adjusted productivity level, A￿
t.


















as well as the resource constraint















￿ b Y ￿
t (130)















0 = b Y ￿
t ￿ b A￿
t ￿ ￿ b K￿
t (132)
The trend adjusted productivity level
0 = b A￿




























￿ b Y ￿
t (135)
and the market capitalization equation
￿

































































where we have assumed that, all along the equilibrium path v￿

















￿1 if vt > ￿Dt
(138)
For our examples, we limit ourselves to the part of the transitional path for which v￿
t = ￿Dt for all t. On that path, the



















38which allows us to write
0 = b A￿

















￿ b Y ￿
t (142)
as well as ￿



























Derivation of equation (39)
Let
Q￿;t = q￿;0 ￿ q￿t (144)
then, when we log-linearize (9) around the steady-state real interest rate r and the implied steady-state user cost
uc￿ = (r + ￿￿ + q￿) (145)





















When we assume that r is approximately linear in the growth rate of per capita GDP, we obtain
r￿ = c1 ￿ q￿t + c2r (147)
which is (39).
Derivation of equation (40)











We are interested in the behavior of this TFP for ￿￿ # 0. In that case, there is no embodied productivity growth and the increase
in productivity after the introduction of the technology is all due to the introduction of an increasing number of varieties over
time.


























= Zv￿ (t ￿ T￿)(￿￿1) (150)
39Taking the ￿rst order Taylor approximation around ￿ = 0 yields that





















(t ￿ T￿)(￿￿2) ￿￿

















(t ￿ T￿)(￿￿2) ￿￿















5(t ￿ T￿)(￿￿2) ￿￿
= Zv￿ (t ￿ T￿)(￿￿1) +
1
2
Zv￿ (t ￿ T￿)￿ ￿￿







Hence, for ￿￿ close to zero,
z￿t ￿ zv￿ + (￿ ￿ 1)ln(t ￿ T￿) +
￿￿
2
(t ￿ T￿) (152)
Derivation of equation (41)
Combining the ￿ve log-linearized equations, we obtain for m￿ = y￿ that






















































= ￿1 + y + ￿2t + ￿3 ((￿ ￿ 1)ln(t ￿ T￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(y ￿ l)) + ￿4￿(y ￿ l) (155)
Combining the ￿ve log-linearized equations, we obtain for m￿ = k￿ that
k￿ = y + ln￿ ￿
1
￿ ￿ 1






































c2￿(y ￿ l) (159)
= ￿1 + y + ￿2t + ￿3 ((￿ ￿ 1)ln(t ￿ T￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(y ￿ l)) + ￿4￿(y ￿ l) (160)
40Figure 1: Actual and ￿tted tonnage of steam and motor ships for four countries
41Figure 2: Technology adoption lags decrease for later inventions




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































45Table 3: Analysis of variance
Total sum of squares = 1287350, N = 833
Model Country Technology Residual Total
SS e⁄ect e⁄ect SS SS
Country e⁄ect alone 29% 29% 71% 100%
Technology e⁄ect 66% 66% 34% 100%
Joint e⁄ect 83% 18% 54% 17% 100%
Table 4: Adoption lags for country groups
Technology Invention USA GBR Japan other Asian Latin Sub-Saharan Other
year (v￿) OECD Tigers America Africa
Steam- and motorships 1788 -92 -76 -5 -50 32 -4 24 35
1 1 1 14 4 10 3 20
Railways - Passengers 1825 -46 5 -26 10 -5 19 11
1 1 14 2 10 9 24
Railways - Freight 1825 -36 -16 -22 5 7 24 17
1 1 18 2 3 6 16
Telegraph 1835 -21 -42 -17 -22 21 -6 30 23
1 1 1 17 3 8 2 16
Telephone 1876 -52 -33 -35 -28 25 -14 10 19
1 1 1 17 4 13 11 30
Electricity 1882 -37 -32 -26 10 -4 11 7
1 1 16 4 15 23 36
Cars 1885 -32 -32 -17 -14 17 -10 6 13
1 1 1 19 4 14 15 27
Trucks 1885 -19 -8 -11 26 -6 -2 13
1 1 18 4 13 10 17
Aviation - Passengers 1903 -7 -12 -8 -5 20 -4 22 2
1 1 1 19 3 7 2 20
Aviation - Freight 1903 -16 -3 -3 18 -7 33 -1
1 1 15 3 2 1 11
Blast Oxygen Steel 1950 -8 -8 -8 -3 8 2 3
1 1 1 17 2 6 13
PCs 1973 -6 -4 -3 ￿1 0 2 1 1
1 1 1 19 3 10 7 27
Cellphones 1973 -4 -4 -7 -3 -1 2 2 1
1 1 1 19 4 15 9 34
MRIs 1977 -2 1 -4
1 10 1
Internet 1983 -4 -2 -1 -2 0 1 2 2
1 1 1 19 4 9 3 21
46Table 5: Adoption dates of three recent technologies for EATs
Singapore Hong Kong Korea Taiwan
PCs 1987 1987 1987
Cellphones 1987 1984 1986 1989
Internet 1991 1990 1990 1991
47